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Ladies and Gentlemen!
For 27 years now, the Atlantic Alliance has provided peace, stability and progress in Europe. During this period, not a square meter of Europe's territory has been lost; none of her populations have been subjected to war; and her industrial base has prospered in a climate of security. No Alliance in the history of the world has been quite so successful in providing both peace and protection of the fundamental values of Alliance members.
While Western Europe thrives, however, it still faces a plethora of problems. First, there is a socio-economic crisis that imposes great agonies upon each of our governments. There are difficulties on the Southern Flank of NATO, ranging in the West from the transition in post-revolutionary Portugal, through Spain, to political problems in ltaly, and grievous and perplexing antagonisms between valued Allies, Greece and Turkey. There is a dilemma in all capitals of the West with respect to East-West relations and the confusion that results with respect to the continuing burden for our defenses. From the European perspective, there are those worrisome signals emanating from Washington with regard to the apparent lack of cooperation in the executive and legislative branches, the hemorrhaging of the American intelligence and security communities, and the relish with which recent scandals have been pursued in public. These factors, and others, merge against a backdrop of what has been described as the relentless growth in sheer Soviet military capabilities. All these developments have caused some to question whether or not this great Alliance has not outlived its utility. lndeed it has caused some to grope for alternate mechanisms to provide for both the individual and collective security of the member nations. Many today have a great tendency, when looking at the strategic environment, to latch on to a particular event, such as Angola, or the events in the Middle East, and draw sweeping conclusions with respect to the future of the Alliance.

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As one views the agenda for the future, it is very important initially to construct the fairest possible appraisal of the strategic environment, and then digest the importance of this collective effort for our future. In the process of that assessment, one must carefully avoid the current penchant for instant analysis and sweeping generalizations affecting our vital and fundamental interests. Such generalizations frequently fail to stand the test of time. Failure to pursue a methodical examination will result in fallacious questions and conclusions about some particular event or crisis.

First, with regard to the threat, in geopolitical terms it is clear that there has been a fundamental change from what was evident some 27 years ago. At that time, the threat was viewed as monolithic, dominated by "democratic centralism", which, in Marxist terms, described a degree of discipline emanating from Moscow throughout the Marxist-Socialist World. Over the decades since, there has been an evolution to multipolarity, with emergence of at least three centers of Marxist control: one in Moscow, one in Peking, and a third group of revolutionary developing states over whom the other two are vying for influence and control. Most importantly, one sees that on many keys strategic issues, the animosity between Moscow and Peking is greater than between either and the Western World. There is one clear lesson to be drawn from this phenomenon: the Western World will realize benefits from this fragmentation only to the degree that it is perceived as relevant, reliable, and consistent by one or more of these centers of Marxist power. To the degree that the Western World is perceived as irrelevant or unreliable, it leaves one or more of these centers of power with no alternative but to seek an accomodation in their own interests, which may even more dramatically alter the strategic balance.

On reviewing the military threat, it has already been described at the outset as relentless in growth by any criteria of measurement. And it is not the result of a dramatic change in Soviet priorities that occured in the past 12 months, as some of the current rhetoric might suggest. There has been a relentless, continuing growth clearly evident to those who have cared to watch, dating back as early as the 1962 Missile Crisis. In this past year, the Soviets outspent the United States, the other superpower, by over a third. They outspent the United States by 20 percent in general purpose forces, by 25 percent in procurement, by 20 percent in research and development, and by 60 percent in strategic systems. The defense sector consumed what has now been estimated at somewhere between 11 and 13 percent of their GNP, almost twice the allocation previously assumed. So while we now recognize that the Soviets are just as inefficient in defense production as they are in their sectors of the economy, more importantly, it confirms the very high priority that they place on defense. When one looks at the military threat, it is best analyzed in net assessment terms, considering each essential element of the NATO Triad. That Triad is composed of strategic or central nuclear systems, theater nuclear systems, and finally Allied conventional land, sea, and air forces. Turning first to central systems, clearly the West enjoys today what has been described by Secretary Rumsfeld as "rough equivalence". But Soviet strategic programs reflect a worrisome dynamism, which has clearly been evidenced during recent years. The USSR has recently completed the development of four new missile systems: three have been tested with multiple warheads and all have demonstrated greatly refined accuracy against hard point targets. Beyond this, the Soviets have deployed a new submarine-launched missile, SSN8, with a 4200 nautical mile range. This missile has been placed on their Delta class submarine and on the new extended hull, Super Delta class submarine. Both of these submarines can submerge in the Bering Sea and launch nuclear missiles covering the entire North American continent (to include the Panama Canal), all of Western Europe, and a large part of Communist China.

lf the dynamic character of Soviel strategic building programs is left unchecked by fair, acceptable SALT agreements, the West will face a necessity for dramatic increases in its own strategic programs during the coming years. Dr. Kissinger has described this increase as something in the order of 20 billions of dollars over a five-year period. While Mr. Rumsfeld has not specified a figure, he has agreed in principle with this assessment. And of principal concern, should we find it necessary to

increase our spending on strategic programs, other needs – and especially our conventional force requirements – will suffer as a consequence.
With respect to the theater nuclear area, there is some comfort today in Western quantitative and qualitative superiority, but here too the picture is highly dynamic. One sees an increase in the caliber, quality, and number of ground-to-ground rocketry, FROGs and SCUDs, facing Western Europe. One sees indications of the development of nuclear-capable artillery, and a dramatic change in the character of Soviet tactical air capabilities facing Western Europe. Two years ago a 2-1 inferiority on the part of the West was more than compensated for by qualitative superiority in Western tactical aircraft. Today, that picture has changed fundamentally, in that the Soviets have doubled the range and load-carrying capacity of their tactical air arm. While two years ago, qualitative limitations relegated most of their aircraft to an air defense role, today they have become a distinctly offensive threat, capable of delivering nuclear weapons against European targets.
The most ominous of all developments has been the recent testing of the Soviet SS-X-20 intermediate range ballistic missile with multiple warheads, which is soon to be deployed against parts of Western Europe and Communist China in a mobile configuration. This situation could dramatically alter the theater tactical nuclear balance.
Finally, with regard to the conventional leg of the Triad, we face the greatest discrepancies in our defense capabilities in Western Europe today. The tragedy of that shortfall is that to the degree it continues to worsen, we must inevitably lower the nuclear threshold and rely increasingly on a nuclear response. In terms of quantitative change, we have seen a dramatic increase in Soviet conventional ground capabilities during the past decade. They have added over 130,000 men to their forces facing Western Europe. They have significantly increased the density of tanks and armored personnel carriers in their divisions while concomitantly increasing their conventional artillery by 50 to 100 percent. The Soviets have increased the size of their divisions by 2 to 3,000 men, depending upon the type, tank or motorized rifle division, so that 20 Soviet divisions today are the equivalent of 25 divisions ten years ago. Also of great significance, one sees a 50 to 100 percent increase in the support base, the sustaining capability of these front echelon divisions. This occurs at a time when the Western World is caught up in the "tooth-to-tail" syndrome, ostensibly to achieve greater efficiency in the force structure, but in reality depleting its sustaining capabilities for conventional battles of any duration. What do these obvious trends show? First, they demonstrate that the Soviet Union has dramatically elevated itself in this past decade from an essentially continental armed force to a global superpower. This is a reality which must be recognized. lt must be fully understood that this new Soviet military capability provides the sustenance for a new phase of imperialism in Soviet foreign policy. Recent events in Southern Africa and especially Angola suggest that the USSR is at least flirting with the initiation of such an imperialist phase.

Recent events also confirm that in a period of strategic, rough equivalence, with multipolarity, and a dynamic Third World, the importance of regional balances becomes quite fundamental to the strategic outlook of the Alliance. In terms of Soviet strategic priorities, the Central European Region is still on the Soviet agenda. The Central Region has continued to receive first priority in manpower, modernization and funds. The character of this overall improvement in Soviet forces facing the Central Region also confirms that Soviet doctrine and planning anticipate the possibility of a conventional phase in the conduct of military operations. However, in the short term, this is not the most likely threat. In a period of apparent strategic balance in Europe, it is unlikely that we will be faced with a blatant Soviet move across Western borders. It seems more likely in this environment that the West will increasingly be faced in the decade ahead with ambiguous and ambivalent crisis situations that have traditionally occured along the flanks or the areas peripheral thereto. These situations may result from the dynamics of Third World developments, and not necessarily from conscious super power designs. But they could well increasingly involve the vital interests of one or more of the great powers. For

these reasons, the development of a consensus for action by the West is all the more important. It is absolutely essential that the Alliance possess sufficient power both to defuse these potentially escalatory situations *and* to prevent defeat by default.

Turning to the United States in this changing strategic environment, one recalls that the United States entered this Alliance 27 years ago with a sense of responsibility for all that happened or did not happen through but the world. The United States also possessed the intellectual, monetary, economic, military, and spiritual resources to sustain that kind of global hyperactivity. Most importantly, the United States enjoyed a unique hegemonic superiority which enabled it to move into world crises and bring about, by sheer weight of its relative superiority, an outcome that has generally met collective Western interests. An analysis of the current strategic environment confirms that those days are now gone.

In the case of Western Europe the change has also been dramatic. One has seen a transition from post-war exhaustion and destruction to economic, social, political, and military recovery. Furthermore, where Western Europe once comfortably accepted American solutions as it struggled with post-conflict recovery, Western Europe is now girded with competitive potential, amenable to partnership and cooperation with its Atlantic partner, but not domination. However, this change in perspective also influences Western European obligations. The United States can no longer be expected to solve unilaterally such global crises, while European nations sit on the sidelines and support or criticize American involvement. The Atlantic Community must henceforth become engaged in developing a consensus for meeting these crises.

A concomitant of this reality is that to the degree Europeans view the United States as unreliable, isolated, introspective, hibernated, decoupled, and all the other terms that are being proposed today, to that degree they will seek solutions which may be competitive or exclusive in character. A global assessment, however, leads one to conclude that exclusive pillars, whether actively or benignly competitive, would not be adequate for meeting the challenges ahead, and would not support Alliance collective efforts.

Finally, our strategic appraisal must include an understanding of the dynamics working within the Third World. At the end of World War II, many Third World nations saw themselves as "relieved of the yoke of imperialist domination". In the recent past, the political evolution of these developing states was greeted with a great deal of idealistic fevor. Many believed the problems facing these new nations were essentially economic in character, and that if economic assistance could be provided these emerging societies, their leaders would opt for moderate political solutions. Many even believed that the Third World was flirting with Marxism because it provided a formula for the equitable distribution of wealth. But that analysis was incorrect. The leaders of those emerging societies were not flirting with Marxism to distribute wealth, but rather to adopt a disciplined system through which to exercise political control and thereby propel their societies into advanced stages of growth. Later they would take care of the products of the success of this telescoped modernization.

Therefore, despite the idealistic views common to the decade of the sixties, Third World countries almost exclusively opted for strong, centralized governments of the far right or left. Today, the West is faced with a legacy of these dictatorial models, capable of the most dramatic shifts in policy and alignment. Their policies not only differ from those of Western governments, but they lack the ameliorating influences more pluralistic political systems impose.

Today, as a consequence of the "energy crisis", the real and perceived power of the Third World has exploded. In this period when the West finds itself constrained by shortages of raw materials and energy resources, it is essential that the Third World view Western industrialized nations as reliable, relevant and consistent with respect to global events. To appear otherwise, will deny the West an opportunity to influence the direction of policies adopted by those developing nations. In addition, the Western nations, as consumers, must deal as a collective entity with the

Third World, to give the added weight required to help shape Third World policies along moderate lines, and to permit the development of just and responsible relationship for the decades ahead. Failure to do so will risk exploitation in detail as the events of October 1973 have confirmed.

One final aspect of the strategic environment that demands our closest attention is the so called socioeconomic crisis. There are some economists who would maintain that the crisis is a purely fiscal phenomenon, characteristic of market economies since their inception, and that „stagflation" is no more than an natural manifestation of traditional economic sine curves. This socioeconomic crisis, however, is far more pervasive, far more dangerous, and more fundamental with respect to the preservation of the Western economic system. While the crisis does primarily have economic overtones, they are not necessarily the exclusive factors. First, even within the realm of economics, the situation is unique in postwar history. For the first time since World War II, all countries have been experiencing the phenomenon simultaneously. Whereas in the past, one nation on a high peak could step in and bail out another in a trough, the West has been totally deprived of that flexibility in today's environment. Secondly, there is a fundamental challenge to the leadership in all the Western nations with respect to "egalitarian economics", that is, the responsibility to justly and responsibly distribute the successes of the Western system among its peoples. There are also the consequences of the explosion in communications, especially television, and the impact instant analysis has had on the mainstream of thought in Western societies. The time has come for the discipline itself to engage in some healthy introspection as to whether it is carrying out its responsibilities for the collective welfare. Finally, for the first time in history, Western industrialized nations are experiencing finite limitations on raw materials, especially those energy-related materials that have spawned Western growth and propelled it since World War II. All these things have merged to lend a character to this socioeconomic crisis which is fundamentally different from any the West has known thus far. It is clear that the problem is common to each and every Western capital, differing only in intensity. Because it is common, it is also clear that common solutions are necessary to achieve desirable results.

There is, however, a contradiction built into some present perspectives on collective solutions to the socioeconomic crisis. Many Western leaders believe that the serious and pervasive nature of the crisis requires the diversion of resources traditionally allocated for security needs. But, if one undercuts the ribcage of mutual trust and confidence between Western nations, their interlocking security arrangements, a jungle of nationalistic propulsion will be released that will destroy any collective efforts to solve problems of trade, energy, monetary policies, and political interelationship. Any Western leader who thinks he can concert to collectively solve the socioeconomic crisis by simultaneously undercutting the bedrock upon which all successful collective efforts must be anchored, will ultimately learn he is launched upon a stillborn course. Continuing confidence in our security arrangements is the absolute prerequisite for successful collective socioeconomic progress.

What lessons can one draw from this over-generalized strategic review? First, economic, political, and military interdependence is a fundamental imperative facing the Free World. Secondly, the task ahead for the Free World, regardless of debate and rhetoric about East-West relations, is the management of pure Soviet military power. Today this military power structure provides the basis for a highly dangerous imperialist phase, if chosen by Soviet leadership. Thirdly, it confirms the growing importance of regional balances. Finally, this strategic review suggests that the pervasive socioeconomic burdens that face Western leaders can be successfully dealt with only through collective action, and that maintaining the umbrella of confidence in our security arrangements is essential to the success of these efforts. There are those who would maintain that the task is too great. However, the same strategic analysis confirms that the Western World from Japan through the North American continent to Western Europe has twice the industrial base of any conceivable conglomerate of Marxist-Socialist enterprises, and one and one half times the manpower resources. Further, the industrialized nations of the West produce 65 percent

of world manufactured products and conducts 70 percent of its trade. Clearly, we need only establish our priorities and summon the will to achieve our goals.

Some would be inclined to suggest that this thesis is a plaintive appeal for a return to an 18th Century balance-of-power international system, where competing blocs strive to maintain broad, strategic equilibrium while daily seeking petty tactical advantage over one another. Such perceptions are wrong. The strategic relationship advocated here are far more visionary. What is proposed is an earnest endeavor to maintain a degree of international stability, which can only be assured by sufficient collective Western strength. In this way, we seek to channel inevitable and necessary historic change within the confines of international law and the accepted mores of international behavior, while simultaneously pursuing the more ephemeral objective of developing a consensus among all nations, large and small, that in the nuclear age, resort to force is no longer acceptable.